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Abstract

This paper examines whether greater prevalence of government-owned banks leads to
qualitatively different outcomes. By reviewing the extensive literature on government
owned banks, the paper determines whether greater government participation in the
financial system leads to greater financial stability, and greater provision of finance for
welfare generating activities. The evidence in literature suggests that the effects of
government participation in the financial system are complex and context-dependent.
This paper finds that while government banks not only provide finance that privately
owned banks fail to provide and finance long-term projects that contribute to the capital
development of an economy, they are also a stabilizing counter-cyclical influence in the
economy. However, there is evidence to show that in several instances, governmentowned banks have been used by politicians for the achievement of political goals. The
paper also identifies gaps in the literature on government-owned banks, and avenues for
future research.
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Introduction

The State has almost always played an important role in the global financial system,
either directly or indirectly. It often intervenes to provide direction to the financial
system indirectly through regulations, for example. Or it may adopt a more involved
approach and set up and operate financial institution of its own. Depending on the
specific country and period under consideration, government-owned financial institutions
may be the largest or most important financial institutions in a particular country.1
However, it is more common to find government owned financial institutions operating
alongside other privately-owned financial institutions. Figure 1 shows the share of assets
of government-owned banks in financial systems around the world in 2010, the latest
year for which data is available.2 The countries that have a higher share of governmentparticipation in the financial system are shaded a darker shade of purple (countries for
which data was not available are shaded grey). It is evident that there is significant
variation in the share of government-owned banks in the financial systems of different
economies. In light of the financial crisis that began in 2007, several large banks were
bailed out or nationalized by their national governments, effectively increasing the degree
of government ownership of banks around the world. However, this has primarily been
a measure for crisis resolution rather than a consistent change in the financial system
as the level of government participation has not increased on average (Table 1).
Table 1: Share of Assets of Government-Owned Banks (%)

Year
1999
2001
2005
2008
2009
2010
Total

Mean
20.68257
15.31088
15.34791
14.82216
16.51933
14.63314
16.10886

SD
24.77218
21.59563
22.55257
19.47171
20.06435
17.51212
20.99351

Source: Author’s Calculations, based on Banking Regulation and Supervision Database (Barth et al.,
2013)

1

This is more likely to have been the case in the early stages of development of the advanced capitalist
countries today, and is perhaps the case in some developing countries today as well.
2
The data used to construct Figure 1 is the Banking Regulation and Supervision Survey of 2012
(Barth et al., 2013), carried out by the World Bank, which is a source of worldwide data on how banks
are regulated and supervised around the in 143 jurisdictions around the world. This survey had data
for the years 2008, 2009, and 2010. The resulting database, supplemented with previous iterations of
the survey also has data for the years 1999, 2001, and 2005. However the number of countries covered
by each survey varies
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Figure 1: Asset Share of Government-Owned Banks (%)
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Note: Countries are shaded gray if data was not available

The heterogeneity in the degree of government participation in the financial systems in different countries raises the question of whether greater government participation leads to a qualitatively different financial system. The different institutional
arrangements of financial markets have typically been discussed in the literature are
in the context of capital-market-based and bank-based financial systems, depending on
whether the central organizing institutions in the financial market are banks or capital
markets. According to Levine (2003), in bank based systems, banks play a leading role
in mobilizing savings, allocating capital, overseeing the investment decisions of corporate managers, and providing risk management vehicles. On the other hand, in capital
market-based systems, securities markets play an equally important role as banks do in
a bank-based system. They are characterized by highly developed capital markets, with
widely dispersed equity and debt instruments, and relatively low involvement of large
banks in the allocation of funds and ownership of assets. Several studies have shown
that bank-based systems have been more successful than capital market-based systems
in promoting long term growth and financial stability. It is also argued that the basis of
the success of bank-based financial systems is their reliance on non-market arrangements
for organizing financial transactions that persist despite increasing globalization and liberalization. By promoting long-term time horizons, mitigating the principal-agent problem, and encouraging financial stability, bank based systems outperform capital-market
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based systems (Pollin, 1995).
Sawyer (2014) problematized the bank-based and capital market-based dichotomy on
the grounds that banks also operate in capital markets. The literature is often structured
with the implicit assumption that bank-based systems do not consist of private banks
that deal in different kinds of equity and debt instruments. Moreover, banks are not
homogeneous entities that only provide loans for long term investment. This dichotomy
does not specify the difference roles played by banks. For instance, investment banks
that can exist in a bank-based financial system promote behavior and tendencies that
are typically characterized as that of a capital markets-based financial system. The
practice of “originate and distribute” as opposed to “originate and retain” is not likely
to generate long term patient lending that facilitates lending for long term productive
investment. Banks do not of themselves have a social purpose, and also seek to maximize
profits.
However, government-owned banking institutions typically do not operate solely on
the principle of profit-maximization and are more likely to have a social purpose. Therefore, this paper examines whether greater prevalence of government-owned banks leads
to qualitatively different outcomes. In particular, this paper reviews extensive literature
on government owned banks to determine whether greater government participation in
the financial system leads to greater financial stability, and greater provision of finance
for welfare generating activities.
The literature typically considers government banks either from a development view
or the related social view on one hand or a political view on the other (Levy Yeyati
et al., 2004). The social view emphasizes the role the government owned banks play
in providing finance to welfare generating activities that tend to be underfinanced due
to the presence of positive externalities. The development view takes a more long-term
perspective and emphasizes the instrumental role played by government-owned banks
in providing finance for the capital development of an economy, especially in economies
that have a scarcity of capital. However, there is a significant strand of the literature
that takes the political view, as per which government owned banks are primarily rent
seeking ventures that are used by politicians to serve their own goals.
The evidence in literature suggests that the effects of government participation in the
financial system are somewhat more complex than suggested by either view. This paper
finds that while government banks not only provide finance that privately owned banks
fail to provide and finance long-term projects that contribute to the capital development
of an economy, they are also a stabilizing counter-cyclical influence in the economy.
However, there is evidence to show that in several instances, government-owned banks
have been used by politicians for the achievement of political goals.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the activities
of government banks in general and whether they differ from those of privately-owned
banks. Sections 3 and 4 specifically consider the activities of government-owned banks
in the short-term and long-term separately. Section 5 explores the problems of corporate
governance of government-owned banks and effects corporate governance has on their
activities. Section 6 deals with the question of political interference and the extent to
which government-banks are used by politicians to advance their own goals, and Section
7 concludes.

2

Activities of Government Banks

What kind of activities do government owned banks engage in? Do they behave any
differently from privately owned banking institutions? It is difficult to answer this question as there is significant heterogeneity in the government-owned banks that operate in
different countries. Nonetheless, the theoretical literature argues that this should be the
case. Participation of the government in the financial sector is often justified as it is seen
as providing services that the privately owned institutions fail to provide. Mazzucato
and Penna (2015b) term this as the Market Failure Theory of government intervention.
This should mean that the services that government-owned banks are almost mutually
exclusive with those of privately owned banks. However, this is typically not the case
as some government-owned banks provide services that are very similar to privatelyowned banks, such as holding deposits and providing loans for varied purposes, such
as consumer loans, small business loans, loans to big corporations, housing loans, and
education loans.

2.1

Lending to Small and Medium Enterprises

However, the distinction between private commercial banks and government-owned commercial banks is often in their objectives. Privately-owned banks usually operate to
maximize profits, while government-owned banks are likely to operate in order to fulfill
other social objectives, such as encouraging saving, promoting home-ownership, providing small business loans, providing finance for infrastructure projects, and providing
finance to the government. The distinction has, to some extent, been documented in the
case of small business loans. Small businesses are often considered an important engine
of growth since as much as 60 percent of total employment in manufacturing in some
countries is in small and medium enterprises. Nonetheless, compared to large firms,
small and medium enterprises are constrained by their access to finance (Beck et al.,
2011). Often, government policy encourages lending to SMEs, especially through gov-
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ernment owned banks. For instance, the Small Business Administration in the United
States guarantees loans made by participating banking institutions to qualifying small
business. The Reserve Bank of India requires banks to allocate a certain proportion of
their lending to "priority" sectors such as small business and agriculture. However, the
evidence regarding lending by government-owned banks to SMEs is mixed. For instance,
while Sapienza (2004) finds that government-owned banks in Italy make loans at lower
interest rates as compared to privately-owned banks, they are found to be more likely
to lend to larger corporations as compared to small enterprises. On the other hand,
Eastwood and Kohli (1999) find that small firms are credit constrained in India and can
only ease the constraints by external borrowing. Moreover, the directed credit policy of
the Reserve Bank of India relaxed the external finance constraint on small businesses as
gross fixed investment grew from 3.4 percent as a share of sales in 1965 to 8.7 percent in
1978, and one-third of this rise can be attributed to the directed credit policy. Between
1994 and 1996, the French government lending program, Comptes pour le développement industriel or CODEVI, allowed banks to hold French household deposits tax-free
for lending to firms in some sectors of the economy making less than e76 million in annual sales. Bach (2014) shows that this program benefited small firms that were credit
constrained and that the program substantially increased debt financing for small firms.

2.2

Development Banks and State Investment Banks

Development Banks and State Investment Banks are another type of government-owned
banking institution, and they play a very important role in financing long-term capital
and infrastructure investment. Mazzucato and Penna (2015a) show that, in 2012, development finance institutions such as investment banks were the single largest type of
player in the climate finance landscape, accounting for 34 percent of the total finance
provided. This is not surprising as state investment banks have historically provided
patient long-term committed capital. In addition to providing counter-cyclical finance
during economic downturns (see Section 3.1), state investment banks have provided finance for industrialization and capital development of the economy, and for targeted
investment in high-risk R&D activities that have significant positive externalities (Mazzucato and Penna, 2015a). The role played by these institutions is assuming greater
importance in light of the short-term and speculative kinds of finance that have become staple for private financial institutions. Development banks played an important
role in not only the developing world, but in the now-developed nations at the time of
their development. For instance, the World Bank made its first loan to France in 1947.
The Industrial Development Bank of Canada and the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau
(KfW, or Reconstruction Credit Institute) in Germany were formed in 1944 and 1948,
respectively, for channeling finance for capital development, modern industry, long-term
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growth, and, in the case of Canada, for small enterprises. The Export Bank of Japan
provided finance for Japanese export industries, while the Japan Development Bank
provided long term capital for investment in heavy industries. Similarly the Brazilian
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico e Social (BNDeS or the National Bank
of Social and Economic Development) and the Korean Development Bank have played
important roles in their respective countries (Mazzucato and Penna, 2015a).
Even today these State Investment Banks are very important in the countries they
operate. BNDeS has a credit line specifically for SMEs, and provides the largest share of
credit for machinery and equipment acquisition (De Negri et al., 2011). De Negri et al.
(2011) show that that access to public credit lines in Brazil has a significant positive
impact on employment growth and exports. The BNDeS has also funding programs
for high-tech firms and innovation (Mazzucato and Penna, 2015a). Investment by the
BNDeS for environmental and climate protection have increased tenfold since 2000.
Similarly, in China, the China Development Bank has been funding alternative energy
firms developing new green technologies. China Development Bank, through its public
equity fund CDB Capital, funds high-tech firms. The China Development Bank is
also the main finance-provider of the Chinese five year plans (Mazzucato and Penna,
2015b). There are two other state policy banks: Agricultural Development Bank and the
Export-Import Bank of China. The State-Owned Commercial Banks in China are also
the only commercial banks that have a significant share (40.7 percent) of medium-term
loans in their loan portfolio. However, most medium-terms loans from the state-owned
commercial banks are for purposes other than capital investment (Andersson et al.,
2013).
Even in the developed world, the KfW and the European Investment Bank are key
providers of patient long-term capital. The KfW initially played a key role in Germany’s
post war reconstruction using the funds from the Marshall Plan. Since then, the KfW has
not only been playing an important counter-cyclical role, but also providing continued
finance for the capital development of the economy. The European Investment Bank
also provides long-term finance in a big way, and has increased its commitments to
new sectors such as renewable energy and supported the modernization of energy grids
(Mazzucato and Penna, 2015b).

2.3

Government Banks, Securitization, and Derivatives Trading

The Financial Crises of 2007-09 had a variety of causes, one of which was the excessive
buildup by risk in financial institutions and the financial system as a whole in the
form of apparently diversified securities and derivatives on their balance sheets. The
extension of large volumes of sub-prime mortgage loans on the back of a housing price
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bubble was worsened by the securitization of these loans, and derivatives made on the
basis of these securities that were traded. Aided by deregulation, banking institutions,
which were hitherto predominantly in the business of taking deposits and making loans,
increasingly created and dealt in such securities. This was the rational thing to do
for profit maximizing banking institutions as these activities were far more profitable
than just taking deposits and making loans. The drive for maximizing profits pushed the
entire financial system into riskier speculative activities. This was not the first time that
such a dynamic was observed. Time and again, financial institutions have repeatedly
jeopardized the financial system by venturing into risky activities in the quest for higher
profits (Kindleberger, 2011(1978). The profit motive also encourages financial innovation
(such as securitization) that seeks to bypass even the existing financial regulation, often
to disastrous consequences (Minsky, 1986).
However, most government-owned banks are mission-oriented and serve a social purpose other than profit maximization. Therefore, it is conceivable that government-owned
banks are less likely to engage in an excessive degree of creation of and trading in these
securities. Unfortunately, there is not much literature to document the extent to which
government-owned banks engaged in securities trading (with the exception of the infamous cases of the Federal National Mortgage Association or Fannie Mae and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or Freddie Mac). Perhaps an indication of the extent
to which government-owned banks engage in trading in securities is by examining the
share of non-interest income in their total income. This is because banks that deal in
securities trading to a greater degree are likely to earn more income from the fees earned
from these operations as opposed to the interest earned on loans. However, a cursory
look at the data does not reveal a consistent relationship between non-interest income
and government-ownership of banks. Figure 2 shows this relationship: each point represents the share of non-interest income in total income for all banks that corresponds
to the share of government-ownership in the banking system of a particular country.
The relationship moves from being mildly positive in 1999, to negative in 2005, to fairly
neutral in 2010.

3

3

This should be interpreted with caution as the coverage of countries in the survey increases from 1999
to 2010. In addition, in 2010, a large number of banks that were the most affected by the crisis due to,
among other reasons, having extensive sources of non-interest incomes, were bailed out by governments.
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Figure 2: Non-interest income and Government-ownership of banks
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3

Government Ownership of Banks and the Short-term

3.1

Lending Behavior and the Business Cycle4

In the literature, government-owned banks are found to be playing a stabilizing role in
the economy. This stabilizing role comes about through credit provision that is either
less pro-cyclical than their privately owned counterparts, or even counter-cyclical in
some instances. Levy Yeyati et al. (2004) find that public banks can play a positive
role in mobilizing savings or providing consumption smoothing at times of crisis. Micco
and Panizza (2006) show that state-owned banks play a stabbilizing role using bank
balance sheet data to show that lending by state-owned banks decreases less during
recessions and increases less during expansions. Among the possible reasons for this
observed behavior, such as the government internalizing the benefits of a more stable
macroeconomic environment, a stable deposit base due to perception of lower likelihood
of failure of state-owned banks during recessions, or the lack of proper incentive for lazy
bureaucrats that run these state-owned banks, they find that there is evidence in favor
of the credit smoothing motive, rather than for lower procyclicality being driven by lazy
bureaucrats.
4

This section draws on Epstein and Dutt (forthcoming)
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Behr et al. (2017) study the lending behavior of 800 local banks providing basic
financial services in Germany using balance sheet data. They find that lending by public
savings banks to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Germany was 25 percent less
sensitive than private cooperative banks from the same area. The literature typically
attributes the differential lending behavior of state-owned banks to political factors (See
Section 6). However, Behr et al. (2017) argue that the large and statistically significant
difference in lending behavior cannot be attributed to political interference, especially
since political interference cannot explain why public savings banks increase their lending
less than private credit banks in expansions. Therefore, it is due to the difference in
objectives of these banks.
Several cross-country analyses also have similar findings. Bertay et al. (2015) find
that the responsiveness of state-owned banks and privately owned banks to change in
growth of GDP per capita is different. Specifically, they find that while privately owned
banks increase (and decrease) their lending by 1.3–1.8 percent in response to a 1 percent
increase (and decrease) in GDP per capita growth, state-owned banks increase (and
decrease) their lending by 0.4 percent. Therefore, lending by state-owned banks is less
procyclical than lending by private banks, and this effect is pronounced in countries with
good governance. Additionally, in recessionary times, they find that lending by stateowned banks is actually countercyclical, and an increase in credit extension by 1–1.2
percent by state-owned banks is associated with a 1 percent decline in growth of GDP
per capita. Similarly, Duprey (2015) studies banks in 83 countries over 1990-–2010,
and shows shows that public banking is associated with less cyclical lending policies,
especially during recessions. However, this result is reversed for public banks in less
developed countries. The lower pro-cyclicality of lending by government-owned banks
in more developed countries is due to these banks increasing their lending less during
expansions as compared to similar banks in less developed countries.
Brei and Schclarek (2013) study the lending responses of 764 government-owned
and privately-owned banks in 50 countries of Europe and Latin America over the period
1994—2009 to examine lending during ystemic financial crises. Consistent with the other
results highlighted, they find robust evidence suggesting a counter-cyclical role played
by government-owned banks in their respective banking systems. This study also shows
that lending by government-owned banks is a tempering influence as these banks do not
lend at an explosive rate during expansions, but their lending counteracts the decrease
in lending by private banks during downturns. In their view, this can be a result of
the following reasons or a combination thereof. First, government-owned banks have
a higher risk bearing capacity and provide higher credit growth precisely to mitigate
the fallout of systemic financial crises on growth. Second, during crises, governmentowned banks find it easier to raise new forms of capital at lower costs that is unlikely
to be available to privately-owned banks. Finally, they argue that deposit funding for
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government-owned banks is also likely to be more stable over the business cycle.
Studying corporate lending by government-owned banks in India and its effect on
corporate investment, Srinivasan and Thampy (2017) show that firms with exclusive relationships with government-owned banks have economically large reduction–30 percent–
in the sensitivity of investment to cash flow, and an increase in efficiency of investment.
In contrast, having exclusive relationships with privately-owned banks increases cash
flow sensitivity. However, the positive effect of exclusive relationships with governmentowned banks is not significant for small enterprises.
In the United States, the only government-owned bank, the Bank of North Dakota
(BND), played an important stabilizing role during the global financial crisis of 2007–09.
The decline in bank lending in 2009 was the most severe since 1942. In particular, the
number of loans and the total amount loaned out under the Small Business Administration’s flagship 7(a) program fell by about 54 percent and 37 percent, respectively,
between 2007 and 2009 (Center for State Innovation (2011)). Of the large privatelyowned banks, the two which received the largest amount in public bailout money, Bank
of America and Citigroup, were lending 94 percent and 54 percent less, respectively,
to small businesses in 2011 (Judd and McGhee, 2011). However, in North Dakota, the
story was different. Between 2007 and 2009, BND was a counter-cyclical force and increased lending to small businesses by 35 percent (Judd and McGhee, 2011). The Bank
of North Dakota achieved this by participating in loans originated by local banks or
credit unions by either increasing the total size of the loan, buying down the interest
rate, or providing loan guarantees. This is called participation lending. Additionally,
bank lending rates in North Dakota remained relatively constant between 2005 and 2011
during the height of the boom in housing prices, providing some much-needed stability
in the economy of North Dakota (Center for State Innovation (2011)).
It is important to note that the literature suggests that growth of lending by public
banks over the expansion is lower as that compared to that of private profit-maximizing
banks. This suggests that public banks are playing a crucial role in tempering the
behavior of private banks in creating credit bubbles that can lead to crises. Restrained
lending during expansions assumes significance for stability since increased credit growth
is linked to the increased likelihood of the occurrence of a crisis (Schularick and Taylor,
2012; Minsky, 1986). It is not surprising that this is the case, since public banks are
likely to be engaged in lending for specific objectives. For instance, in China, there are
a variety of state-owned banks (Andersson et al., 2013) that lend for the promotion of
specific policy objectives, which are unlikely to change over the business cycle. Moreover,
lending by these banks is also growth promoting. It is also likely that general state-owned
commercial banks lend with restraint during the expansion as, more often than not, they
serve a public mandate that is unlikely to be served by engaging in risky, destabilizing
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credit extension (Epstein and Dutt, forthcoming).

3.2

Government Ownership and Efficiency

Several studies consider the question of whether ownership identity of banks has an
impact on their efficiency. The established wisdom is summarized well in Altunbas et al.
(2001). Banks that are either owned by the government or owned mutually are expected
to be less efficient than private banks. Theoretically, in the literature, a lack of capital
market discipline suggests that the management of these banks experience less pressure
to minimize costs and make loans that are expected to generate maximum risk adjusted
returns (Altunbas et al., 2001). This pressure is further alleviated by implicit or explicit
government guarantees (Iannotta et al., 2013). Therefore,the literature that explores the
relationship between banking ownership and efficiency do so based on profit indicators
such as Return on Assets, Return on Equity, or Net Interest Margin. Alternatively,
these studies conduct Stochastic Frontier Analysis to estimate efficiency measures.
Stochastic Frontier Analysis deems a firm or bank as inefficient if its costs are higher
or its profits are lower than those predicted for an efficient bank using the same combination of inputs and outputs. If a bank is efficient, then any difference in costs or profits
from the predicted efficient cost or profit should be due to statistical noise. The cost or
alternative profit frontier of the efficient bank are determined based on a cost or alternative profit function with a composite error term, which consists of a two sided error
of random fluctuations in costs or profits and a one sided positive error of inefficiency
(Altunbas et al., 2001).
The rationale behind assessing banks in this way is twofold. First, this strand of
literature determines whether banks are providing financial intermediation services with
minimum waste of resources as is possible. Second, the literature implicitly assumes that
operating efficiently and maximizing profits subject to regulatory requirements would
also ensure the financial soundness of the banks, and by extension, the financial stability
of the system of which the banks are constituents.
While the conventional wisdom is that government owned banks are less efficient,
based on these analyses, the evidence in the literature about the efficiency of government
owned banks vis-a-vis privately owned banks is mixed. Micco et al. (2007) use annual
bank-level data from 179 countries to assess the relationship between bank ownership
and performance. The study uses standard measures of efficiency such as return on
assets, interest margins, overhead costs, and employment to measure bank performance.
In general, they find that retail banks tend to be more profitable in developing countries
while banks with a higher share of non-interest income such as investment banks are
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more profitable in developed countries. More specifically, they find that governmentowned banks in developing countries on average have lower profitability, lower margins,
and higher overhead costs as compared to privately owned banks. However, the relationship between bank ownership and efficiency is weaker and not significant in developed
countries. The authors surmise that this is probably because high-income countries are
better equipped to deal with the distortions that arise from government ownership. Alternatively, they argue, this relationship can be attributed to government-owned banks
playing a developmental role in developing countries and their low profitability is due
to such banks following a social mandate as opposed to maximizing profits, which is
not the case for advanced countries. Similarly, Cornett et al. (2010) study 16 Asian
countries between 1989 and 2004 and find that, on average, government owned banks
have lower profitability, held less core capital, and had greater credit risk as compared
to privately owned banks.
Focusing on banks in European countries, Iannotta et al. (2013) study the impact
of government ownership on the credit ratings assigned to banking institutions. Specifically, they consider the impact of ownership on traditional issuer ratings, which are
based on an assessment of default risk, and individual ratings, which are based on an
assessment of insolvency risk. Individual ratings, according to the authors, individual
ratings differ from traditional issuer ratings as they focus on the viability of a bank’s
operations independent of external support from the bank’s owners, the government, or
other financial institutions. They find that while government owned banks have better
issuer ratings than privately owned banks, on average, they also have poorer individual
ratings than privately owned banks due to their higher insolvency risk in the absence of
government support.
Beck et al. (2005) examine the effect of privatization on bank performance in Nigeria
during the 1990s. Specifically, the study assesses the performance of fourteen banks that
constituted 50 percent of the assets of the banking system, which were privatized in the
early 1990s, relative to the same banks prior to privatization and other privately owned
banks in Nigeria. In their analysis, while the privatized banks performed significantly
worse in terms of return on assets, return on equity, and share of non-performing assets
as compared to privately owned commercial banks before privatization, the gap between
the two groups of banks is reduced after privatization. However, thereafter, there were
not any significant performance gains in the privatized banks vis-a-vis other private
banks in Nigeria. Similarly, Bonin et al. (2005) study the privatization of banks in 8
former Soviet nations in Eastern and Southern Europe. The banking systems in the
countries examined are quite different. However, using Stochastic Frontier Analysis,
they find that while government-owned banks are less efficient than privately owned
ones, the difference in performance is not statistically significant. Karas et al. (2010), on
the other hand, study the relationship between ownership and efficiency in the Russian
12

banking system using stochastic frontier analysis that public banks are more efficient as
compared to domestic private banking institutions. Moreover, the authors argue that
this difference cannot be explained by differences in activity mix, risk preference, or the
availability of deposit insurance.
Government owned banks are also found to be no less efficient than privately owned
banks in Germany. Using balance sheet data for private commercial banks, public
savings banks, and mutually owned cooperative banks in Germany between 1989 and
1996, Altunbas et al. (2001) are unable to verify the commonly held view of private
banks operating more efficiently than nonprivate banking institutions. In general, they
find that all three types of banks benefit from economies of scale, and that both public
savings banks and mutual cooperative banks have a slight cost and profit advantage
over comparable private commercial banks; this cost advantage can be attributed to
their lower cost of funds. Notably, their results do not indicate that agency problems
for nonprivate banks in the German banking system.
For the most part, the literature on efficiency compares banks based on the unifying
metric of whether they are able to minimize costs and/or maximize profits regardless of
the objectives or mission of the banking institutions in question. This is especially problematic when comparing the performance of government-owned and mutually-owned
banks with privately owned banks since the former group of banks are more likely to be
operating according to objectives other than profit maximization. This is even at odds
with the mainstream theoretical literature on government owned enterprises, which only
considers government owned and operated enterprises as a necessary evil in the presence of market failure. According to this Market Failure Theory, government should
only provide service that profit maximizing firms are unable to feasibly provide in the
market (Mazzucato and Penna, 2015a). If we accept this theory, then assessing government owned banks (or any government owned enterprise) on the basis of a profit
maximization metric is incorrect as the government owned banks are providing services,
such as small loans to low-income households, that are necessarily less profitable than
those provided by privately owned banks.
Mazzucato and Penna (2015a) rejects this view of government-owned enterprises and
argues that the state plays a market-shaping role as opposed to one that is merely filling
the gaps left by private enterprise. They argues that the government often addresses
innovation and societal challenges by making transformative mission-oriented public
investments that create new technologies and sectors that did not exist before, which
the private sector was previously wary investing in. In this case, static tools of profit
maximization and cost minimization are inappropriate to evaluate government policy or
government-owned enterprises and banks that makes risky investments that are dynamic,
have significant positive externalities, and that only bear fruition over a long period of
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time.
That being said, it is clear from the literature that even based on the static unifying
metric of profit maximization, the evidence regarding the efficiency of government-owned
banks as compared to their privately-owned counterparts is mixed. Moreover, several
studies find that government owned banks are as efficient, on average, as privately
owned banks. This suggests that even a public or social mandate cannot be attributed
to all government-owned banks regardless of the policy context in which they operate,
and more careful evaluation is required that takes into accounts the objectives of the
particular banks being evaluated.

4

Government Ownership of Banks and the Long-Term

One strand of literature on government owned banks considers the relationship between
their prevalence and macroeconomic growth outcomes. The participation of the government in the financial sector is often justified as required to engender capital development
economy, especially since privately owned profit-maximizing financial institutions do not
find it profitable to provide finance for activities such as infrastructure investment, providing capital to small and medium enterprises, or providing long-term patient venture
capital to new firms. Therefore, active government participation in the financial sector can promote large scale industrialization of an economy. This is the view that is
commonly associated with Gerschenkron (1962) and is loosely termed the development
view.
Skeptics of whether the government will be able to effectively play this role argue
that, the government may either be unable to pick winners or that politicians would
capture government owned banks (or government owned enterprises, more generally) and
orient its operations towards political objectives such as providing political patronage
or favorable terms of credit to their supporters in order to win elections and/or earn
high rents. This view is loosely termed the political view (see, for example, Shleifer
and Vishny (1994)). If this were the case, then greater participation by the government
would not spur economic growth, and would, on the contrary serve as an impediment
to growth.
One of the early influential studies in this regard is La Porta et al. (2000). The authors construct an extensive cross-country dataset on government ownership of banks by
considering the largest banks in 92 countries to study the extent of government ownership
in the banking system in different countries, the country characteristics associated with
greater government participation in the banking system, and the subsequent financial
and economic development associated with government ownership of banks. Notably,
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they find that higher government ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent development of the financial system, lower economic growth, and lower growth
in productivity. They find that a reduction in government ownership of banks by 10
percentage points is associated with 0.23 percentage points higher growth rate.
This result has been highly influential and is cited widely to justify government
policy. It is also cited in almost all the literature on government ownership of banks.
However, their results do not bear scrutiny. Andrianova et al. (2012) use their dataset
and show that the negative effect of government ownership of banks disappears on the
inclusion of other institutional variables that were also present in the original dataset
used by La Porta et al. (2000). Thereafter, they extend the analysis to 128 countries
between 1995 and 2007 and find that the coefficient of the effect of government ownership on growth becomes positive. Specifically, they find that countries with 50 percent
government ownership grew by 1.8 percentage per annum faster than countries without government ownership in the banking system. Korner and Schnabel (2011) argue
that there is greater heterogeneity in the relationship between government ownership of
banks and growth than is suggested by La Porta et al. (2000). They find that there is a
negative relationship between government ownership of banks and growth in countries
with lower financial development; this relationship weakens however with an increase in
the level of financial development and becomes positive.
Instead of adopting a cross-country approach, Andersson et al. (2013) study the
effect of bank lending on economic growth in China between 1997 and 2008. They
study the effect of lending by different types of banking institutions operating in China:
State Policy Banks, which are the key providers of policy related loans; State-Owned
Commercial Banks; Joint Stock Commercial Banks, which have a lower degree of state
involvement as compared to the state-owned commercial banks; and Rural Credit Cooperatives. They find that traditional policy banks and Joint Stock commercial banks
are growth promoting. In their analysis, however, State-Owned Commercial Banks and
Rural Credit Cooperatives reduce growth in the short term, even though lending by the
latter has positive effects on agricultural production.

5

Government Banks and Corporate Governance

In general, there are two strands of literature on corporate governance: one that considers the impact of different types of ownership as forms of governance–domestic ownership, foreign ownership, and state ownership (Berger et al., 2005). This strand of
literature is closely related to the literature that studies the impact of ownership on
bank efficiency (Section 3.2). The other strand of literature primarily focuses on the
principal-agent problem between owners of a firm or bank and the managers that are
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responsible for the day-to-day activities of these firms. Therefore, in this context, "governance" is used to refer to methods owners or shareholders use to reduce the costs
associated with the principal-agent problem, such as board composition, voting rules,
and stakes held by managers.
While there is practically no literature that theorizes the corporate governance of
government-owned banks, the corporate governance of banks and some considerations
of the corporate governance of government-owned enterprises are summarized succinctly
in Levine (2004) and Banerjee (1997), respectively. Levine (2004) argues that if bank
managers face sound governance mechanisms, they are more likely to "allocate capital
efficiently and exert corporate governance over the firms they fund." However, if bank
managers have significant discretion over their actions without adequate oversight, they
can easily manage the bank in a way that serves their interests rather than that of
the shareholders or owners. Therefore, the management of funds mediated by banking
institutions would neither be optimal from the perspective of the firm, nor for the
efficiency of capital allocation in the economy.
While any type of bank owner–private, foreign, or government–would have to solve
the problems of governance, they are particularly acute for government-owned banks.
This is not only because banks are generally more opaque than other non-financial
firms (Levine, 2004), but also because it is difficult to monitor the bureaucrats that
are responsible for the operations of government-owned banks. Social objectives that
are meant to be fulfilled by government-owned banks can be undermined by bureaucrats
following elevating their interest above the social interest. Moreover, it is hard to monitor
the mechanisms used by bureaucrats to make lending decisions (Banerjee, 1997), not
least because of the significant informational asymmetries that characterize financial
markets. In addition, monitoring by depositors is reduced due to the implicit deposit
insurance provided by government ownership, even if the financial system in question
has no provision for explicit deposit insurance.
Therefore, typically, governance mechanisms that reduce the principal agent problem and make a firm’s governance more favorable to the shareholders or owners are
considered desirable. There are several indices that measure corporate governance, like
the Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ). Beltratti and Stulz (2009) use this, among
other things to explain the differential performance of banks during the recent financial
crisis of 2007-2009. They find that banks with a higher CGQ do not perform better than
firms with a lower GCQ. In particular, they find that firms with more pro-shareholder
boards actually performed worse on average. They argue that this is not evidence that
good governance is bad; rather that is suggests "banks that were pushed by their boards
to maximize shareholder wealth before the crisis took risks that were understood to create shareholder wealth, but were costly ex post..." (Beltratti and Stulz, 2009). Instead,
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they find that banks with higher Tier I capital ratio and higher deposits performed
better during the crisis, regardless of governance structure. Similarly, using a dataset
covering 296 of the largest financial firms over 30 countries, Erkens et al. (2012) find
that financial firms with more independent boards and higher share of ownership by
institutional investors had poorer stock market returns during the crisis period.
The upshot of this discussion is that while, theoretically, the literature points to several corporate governance problems for government-owned banks, traditional measures
of good corporate governance do not guarantee good performance.

6

Political Interference

Government-owned enterprises are often criticized as being inefficient as they are often used by government to serve its own political ends, often to the detriment of the
soundness of the individual institution in question. Additionally, the use by governmentowned enterprises by politicians in the government may also come at the expense of the
social objectives the enterprise is supposed to fulfill. Essentially, government-owned enterprises can be exploited by politicians to stay in power, and government-owned banks
are no exception in this regard. This is loosely called political interference in the literature. In fact, Dinç (2005) argues that political influence is of a greater concern at
government-owned banks for a variety of reasons. He argues that due to the asymmetry
of information that characterizes banking, political motivations can be easily disguised
in loan decisions. Additionally, while a government-owned enterprise in any other sector
can only be used to exert political influence in a particular industry, political control
of government-owned banks allows the channeling of finance across all sectors of an
economy.
Some studies examine the extent of political interference in government-owned banks.
Sapienza (2004) analyzes lending data from Italian banks and balance sheets of 37000
firms to study the effects of government ownership on bank lending behavior. This study
finds that state-owned banks charge a lower interest rate to similar firms as compared
to privately-owned banks (an average difference of 44 basis points), even though firms
are able to borrow more from privately-owned banks. Sapienza (2004) also finds that
lending behavior depends on the electoral fortunes of the party affiliated with the bank:
the interest charged charged is lower in the areas where the political party affiliated
with the bank is strongest. Additionally, as mentioned previously, state-owned banks
are shown to lend more to large firms as compared to smaller ones. However, stateowned banks are found to lend more in depressed areas as compared to their privately
owned counterparts. Khwaja and Mian (2005) consider the universe of corporate lending
using loan-level data in Pakistan between 1996 and 2002 to study rents to politically
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connected firms. They find that politically connected firms receive preferential treatment
from government-owned banks, and these firms borrow 45 percent more despite their 50
percent higher default rate as compared to firms that are not politically connected.
Dinç (2005) uses bank-level data from 36 countries between 1994 and 2000 to show
that government-owned banks increase their lending in election years relative to privatelyowned banks. However, the share of loans as a share of total assets is not higher in
government-owned banks over the electoral cycle. Additionally, in emerging market
economy, government-owned banks hold a higher proportion of their assets in the form
of government securities. In this analysis, banks that are better capitalized increase
their lending more, regardless of ownership. Banks also increase lending when government does not have a deficit "to finance" (Dinç, 2005). However, it could also be the
case that budget surpluses increase total expenditure allocation to government-owned
banks. Therefore, increase in lending during the election cycle does not necessarily suggest lending for political reasons being supported by government-owned banks. Dinç’s
(2005) analysis also does not control for the monetary policy stance: a loose monetary
policy could explain greater liquidity for lending. Moreover, it could also be the case the
pressure on government-owned banks to follow monetary policy queues more promptly
than privately-owned banks, which could explain the higher holding of government securities as compared to privately-owned banks. However, these hypotheses have not been
empirically tested.
Most studies that look at political interference in government-owned banks examine
bank performance around elections. In contrast, Shen et al. (2014) look at government
interference in government-owned banks as requiring assistance to or acquisition of distressed financial institutions. The authors argue that this is done frequently to avoid
bank runs and maintain financial stability and, therefore, these decisions are not typically driven by considerations of increasing profitability or market share. They argue
that the poor performance of government-owned banks measured by the conventional
performance measures like ROA and ROE can be attributed to the the provision of
assistance to or acquisition of distressed banks. Prior to acquisition, government-owned
banks do not perform worse than privately-owned banks that acquire distressed banks.
They also find that government banks that did not acquire distressed banks performed
no worse than private banks, regardless of whether they acquired a distressed bank or
not.
It is important to note that all kinds of firms have political connections with their
respective governments. Faccio (2010) defines a firm as being politically connected if
“at least one of its large shareholders (anyone controlling at least 10 percent of voting
shares) or one of its top officers (CEO, president, vice-president, chairman, or secretary)
is a member of parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or party”
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(Faccio, 2010). The study finds that politically connected firms have higher leverage,
pay lower taxes, and have stronger market power. Therefore, regardless of whether
the government is the controlling shareholder of a firm, several otherwise privately
owned firms have also shown to have the potential for political interference. Therefore,
government-owned banks are unlikely to be unique as regards political interference, as
privately-owned banks may potentially also get preferential political treatment, or be
persuaded to provide preferential treatment on behalf of politicians. There is evidence
of a revolving door between financial firms and financial regulators. However, there is
no systematic study that explores political interference in privately-owned banks.

7

Conclusion

From the extensive literature reviewed it is clear that the effect of government-owned
banks is fairly complex and context-specific. There is some evidence to show that
government-owned banks are institutions that are providing business credit to otherwise cash-constrained small and medium enterprises, the beneficiaries of government
lending are also shown to be larger enterprises and firms that are more politically
connected. Government-owned banks and Development Finance Institutions are also
shown to be playing a crucial role in providing finance for long-term developmental
needs. Government-owned banks are also typically more mission-oriented, but the extent to which they also traffic in derivative financial instruments for speculative purposes is unclear. There is substantial documentation of the counter-cyclical role played
by government-owned banks: lending by these institutions is shown to reduce less in an
economic downturn than their privately-owned counterparts; in some instances, lending
is even shown to increase. Significantly, lending by these institutions is also more tempered during economic booms, suggesting that government-owned banks indeed play a
stabilizing role in the financial system.
Based on standard measures of efficiency, there is also mixed evidence regarding the
efficiency of government-owned banks. However, it is notable that several studies find
that government-owned banks are no less efficient than their privately-owned counterparts. Moreover, insofar as government owned banks may be less efficient based on
standard criterion based on the assumption of profit-maximization, they are not found
to have a detrimental impact on economic growth. There is evidence that governmentowned banks are subject to interference by politicians who would like to use these institutions to serve their own goals. However, there is not much evidence to show that this
comes at the cost of viability of government-owned banking institutions. Nonetheless,
evidence of the use of these institutions to nurture relations of crony capitalism is indeed
a matter for concern. However, the problems of crony capitalism are not exclusive to

19

government-owned banks, as even privately-owned firms (banks and non-financial firms)
are shown to benefit from any political connections that they may have.
It is also clear from the literature that there are several crucial aspects of governmentownership of banks that have escaped significant academic attention. First, it is not
clear to what extent government-owned banks trade in securities and other financial
instruments that were associated with destabilizing the global financial system. It may
be the case that government-owned banks, like all other financial institutions, maintain
some of their assets in such securities in order to maintain a diversified portfolio of
assets. However, is it the case that they misuse their implicit or explicit government
guarantee to take on excessive risk by taking large positions in such securities? If this
were the case, than these institutions would be a destabilizing influence in the financial
system as well, given their average size and government guarantee. However, there is
little research that explores this matter.
Second, even though the evidence on the average efficiency of government-owned
banks as compared to privately-owned banks is mixed, the literature is predominantly
based on measures of efficiency that assume that all banks seek to maximize profits.
However, several government-owned banks often have other objectives. Therefore, measures of efficiency that take into account the objectives of the institutions under consideration should be used to study the efficiency of government owned banks. Such a
measure should examine whether government-owned banks can successfully carry out
their operations while maintaining viability, even if it does not mean maximum profits
for the given inputs. That being said, some of the literature shows that, even based
on standard measures of efficiency, government-owned banks perform no worse than
privately owned banks. This could partly be due to the government-owned banks operating on the principles of profit maximization: not all government-owned banks operate
to maximize social welfare. Therefore, studies of efficiency should pay attention to the
objectives of the banking institutions under consideration, even if they are owned by
the government.
Third, the lacuna in the literature on the corporate governance of government-owned
banks is quite significant as there are practically no guiding principles provided by the
economics literature, despite the prevalence of government ownership of banks. This
is especially problematic since the literature identifies problems of political interference
that can potentially be mitigated with the appropriate structures of corporate governance and other institutional mechanisms. Government-owned banks are an important
part of the financial system and further research along these lines would only serve to
improve our understanding of these institutions and can help guide policy to make them
as effective as is possible.
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